beads: close hc-fbd (next healthcheck due date)

The feature commit 6313857 cites hc-nkq in its subject; the real id is
hc-fbd — the id was guessed from a truncated bd create output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.beads/issues.jsonl

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 {"_type":"issue","id":"hc-5ix.4","title":"Session data model: option-backed in-progress healthcheck record","description":"One in-progress session per site at a time. Stored in a custom option (or a CPT — pick during implementation). Shape: id, started_at, finished_at, technician_id, site_url_snapshot, per_step_state { status: not_started|in_progress|done|skipped|blocked|n_a, notes, completed_at }. Designed so phase-3 automation can attach structured findings later.","notes":"Built in phase-1 scaffold; passing lint + WP-eval end-to-end smoke test on testsite.","status":"closed","priority":1,"issue_type":"task","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-06-11T14:36:11Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-06-11T14:49:27Z","started_at":"2026-06-11T14:41:27Z","closed_at":"2026-06-11T14:49:27Z","labels":["phase-1"],"dependencies":[{"issue_id":"hc-5ix.4","depends_on_id":"hc-5ix","type":"parent-child","created_at":"2026-06-11T15:36:11Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","metadata":"{}"}],"dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
 {"_type":"issue","id":"hc-5ix.2","title":"Plugin skeleton: header, activation hook, deactivation hook, admin menu (Tools → Site Healthcheck), capability gate","notes":"Built in phase-1 scaffold; passing lint + WP-eval end-to-end smoke test on testsite.","status":"closed","priority":1,"issue_type":"task","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-06-11T14:36:10Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-06-11T14:49:26Z","started_at":"2026-06-11T14:41:27Z","closed_at":"2026-06-11T14:49:26Z","labels":["phase-1"],"dependencies":[{"issue_id":"hc-5ix.2","depends_on_id":"hc-5ix","type":"parent-child","created_at":"2026-06-11T15:36:09Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","metadata":"{}"}],"dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
 {"_type":"issue","id":"hc-5ix.1","title":"Bootstrap: trigger install of wp-site-recovery plugin as step 0","description":"Healthcheck plugin should check on activation if site-recovery is installed; if not, fetch and install from a known URL/ZIP and activate it. Block stepper from starting until recovery is in place.","notes":"Detection half done (status panel + manual link). Auto-install of recovery plugin from a private URL is the wp-site-recovery side of hc-5ix.27 — closing this as 'detection complete'.","status":"closed","priority":1,"issue_type":"task","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-06-11T11:26:40Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-06-11T15:03:02Z","closed_at":"2026-06-11T15:03:02Z","labels":["phase-1"],"dependencies":[{"issue_id":"hc-5ix.1","depends_on_id":"hc-5ix","type":"parent-child","created_at":"2026-06-11T12:26:39Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","metadata":"{}"}],"dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
-{"_type":"issue","id":"hc-fbd","title":"Next healthcheck due date per site","description":"Technician can set 'next healthcheck due' while working a session; stored on the server against the healthcheck row, surfaced in the dashboard site list and session views so it is visible when planning work.","acceptance_criteria":"Plugin UI sets/clears a date on the active session; server persists + validates YYYY-MM-DD; dashboard shows next-due per site (derived from latest session) and per session; report includes it; tests pass.","status":"open","priority":2,"issue_type":"feature","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-07-23T10:50:25Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-07-23T10:50:25Z","dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
+{"_type":"issue","id":"hc-fbd","title":"Next healthcheck due date per site","description":"Technician can set 'next healthcheck due' while working a session; stored on the server against the healthcheck row, surfaced in the dashboard site list and session views so it is visible when planning work.","acceptance_criteria":"Plugin UI sets/clears a date on the active session; server persists + validates YYYY-MM-DD; dashboard shows next-due per site (derived from latest session) and per session; report includes it; tests pass.","status":"closed","priority":2,"issue_type":"feature","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-07-23T10:50:25Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-07-23T11:04:08Z","closed_at":"2026-07-23T11:04:08Z","close_reason":"Implemented and released in 0.1.4: server column + validation + dashboard views, plugin date control, 42-test suite. Commits 6313857, 55990be.","dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
 {"_type":"issue","id":"hc-lh6","title":"Dashboard: reopen a finished healthcheck","description":"Techs sometimes finish a healthcheck and later need to add a note (client came back with something after signoff). Currently there's no way to unfinish — the session is read-only on the dashboard.\n\nAdd a 'Reopen' button on the session-detail dashboard view that clears finished_at on the server, plus tighten the PUT /healthchecks/{id} controller so it doesn't accidentally reopen sessions when a client sends an empty body (latent bug: Validate::optionalInt returns null for missing keys, so an empty PUT currently sets finished_at=NULL).","design":"**Backend:**\n1. Tighten Controllers/Healthchecks::update() to use array_key_exists('finished_at', $body) instead of optionalInt. Missing key = no-op; present-with-null = reopen; present-with-int = finish/update.\n2. Add POST /dashboard/healthchecks/{id}/reopen — session-authenticated (mirrors the GET /dashboard auth pattern), CSRF-protected via a per-session token.\n3. On success, redirect back to the session detail page.\n\n**Frontend (dashboard):**\n4. In renderSessionDetail(), when finished_at !== null, add a small form with the reopen button + hidden CSRF token.\n5. Confirm dialog via inline JS onsubmit so the button isn't a one-click landmine.\n\n**CSRF token pattern:** stored in $_SESSION['att_hc_csrf'], generated on first use with random_bytes(16); verified with hash_equals().\n\n**Not doing (option (b) from the discussion):** preserving original finished_at in a separate column. If we want that later it's a separate migration + Store change.","acceptance_criteria":"- [ ] Empty PUT /healthchecks/{id} does not reopen (returns 200 no-op)\n- [ ] PUT /healthchecks/{id} with {\"finished_at\": null} reopens\n- [ ] PUT /healthchecks/{id} with {\"finished_at\": \u003cint\u003e} still finishes\n- [ ] Dashboard session-detail view shows Reopen button only when finished\n- [ ] Clicking Reopen (with confirm) clears finished_at and reloads the page\n- [ ] Reopen POST rejected without valid CSRF token\n- [ ] Reopen POST rejected without valid dashboard session","status":"closed","priority":2,"issue_type":"feature","assignee":"Steve Hanlon","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-07-21T10:50:06Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-07-21T10:52:00Z","started_at":"2026-07-21T10:50:12Z","closed_at":"2026-07-21T10:52:00Z","close_reason":"Implemented: dashboard reopen button + CSRF + tightened Healthchecks::update controller so empty PUT no longer accidentally reopens sessions.","dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
 {"_type":"issue","id":"hc-adg","title":"Recovery installer pulls unpinned 'latest' from Gitea + auto-activates without signature check","description":"`recovery-installer.php` (`resolve_latest_ref()` L67-92, install L148) fetches the recovery plugin from Gitea using an unpinned reference (releases → tags → `main` branch archive fallback), then feeds the downloaded ZIP straight to WP's `Plugin_Upgrader::install()` which activates the code.\n\nTrust anchor is Gitea repo integrity: whoever controls the recovery repo (or a leaked Gitea deploy token) controls what runs on every install at next tech click.\n\nTLS verification is on (default `wp_remote_get` behaviour, not disabled anywhere), so MITM is out of scope — but supply-chain compromise of the Gitea repo is not.\n\nNote: this is the same trust model as the new PUC auto-update flow (hc-8gb) — so it's not a new risk introduced by that change, but it's worth naming and mitigating in the same pass.","design":"Options:\n\n**a) Pin to signed tags only.** Require the recovery installer to reject anything that isn't a signed tag (verify via Gitea API's tag object). Only works if we start GPG-signing releases.\n\n**b) Verify a SHA-256 hash from a second source.** Ship an expected-hash constant in the plugin (updated at release time). Installer fetches ZIP + verifies hash before install. Simple, effective, but couples plugin releases to recovery releases.\n\n**c) Detached signature file alongside the ZIP.** e.g. `recovery-1.2.3.zip.sig` verified against a public key baked into the healthcheck plugin. Best long-term option, most setup.\n\n**d) Reduce blast radius via read-only, single-repo Gitea tokens.** Doesn't stop repo compromise but shrinks the credential footprint.\n\nRecommendation: start with **(b)** — quick win. Consider **(c)** if we ever distribute recovery outside the internal network.","acceptance_criteria":"- [ ] Recovery installer refuses to install a ZIP whose SHA-256 doesn't match an expected value shipped in the plugin (or a similar integrity check)\n- [ ] Recovery repo Gitea token is read-only + scoped to just that repo\n- [ ] README documents the release-integrity flow","notes":"Reported in 2026-07-16 security review. Flagged as risk #2 of 3.\n\nRelated: hc-8gb introduced PUC-based auto-updates for THIS plugin with the same trust model. Any signing/hashing scheme we build for recovery should be reusable for the healthcheck plugin's own updates.","status":"open","priority":2,"issue_type":"bug","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-07-16T10:14:40Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-07-16T10:14:40Z","dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}
 {"_type":"issue","id":"hc-gp3","title":"Harden API key handling — remove settings-page echo, add DB encryption or force constants","description":"Central-server API key is currently exposed in two ways that widen the blast radius of a compromise:\n\n1. `admin-page.php:749` renders the key back into an `\u003cinput type=\"password\"\u003e` on the settings page — trivially unmasked via DOM inspector by any user with `manage_options`.\n2. When set via the settings UI (not a wp-config constant), the key is stored plaintext in `wp_options` under `att_hc_api_key` — readable by any user or process with DB access.\n\nBecause the same key is shared across every WP install that talks to the central server, a leak from one site gives read/write on every other site's healthcheck history.","design":"Options (pick one or combine):\n\n**a) Never render the key back into the input.** Show only a masked placeholder like `••••••••abc3` (last 4 chars) with a 'change' button that swaps in an empty input. Won't help against DB reads but blocks the easiest exfiltration path.\n\n**b) Force wp-config constants only.** Delete the settings-page input for the key entirely; require `ATT_HC_API_KEY` in `wp-config.php`. Simple, most secure, but loses the managed-host convenience the original design called out (`class-att-hc-api.php:14-19`).\n\n**c) Encrypt the option at rest.** Use a key derived from `AUTH_KEY` / `SECURE_AUTH_KEY` (already in wp-config) to encrypt the DB value. Still readable by anyone who can read both DB + wp-config, but that's a higher bar than DB-only.\n\n**d) Per-site keys instead of a shared key.** Bigger change on the server side (would need a keys table + rotation). Correct long-term fix. Files as a follow-up if we do (a)/(b) now.\n\nRecommendation: **(a) + prefer (b)** for new installs, document (b) as the strong default in README, keep (c)/(d) as future work.","acceptance_criteria":"- [ ] Settings page no longer echoes the key value into the DOM\n- [ ] README + wp-config docs recommend the constant path as the strong default\n- [ ] Existing option-based configs continue to work (no breakage on client sites)\n- [ ] Consider filing a follow-up for (d) per-site keys","notes":"Reported in 2026-07-16 security review. Flagged as risk #1 of 3.\n\nRelated risks (separate issues):\n- Recovery installer unpinned 'latest' pull\n- No rate limiting on server API + dashboard","status":"open","priority":2,"issue_type":"bug","owner":"steve@hanlon.co.uk","created_at":"2026-07-16T10:14:21Z","created_by":"Steve Hanlon","updated_at":"2026-07-16T10:14:21Z","dependency_count":0,"dependent_count":0,"comment_count":0}